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Recent Developments in the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance
There have been three areas of recent developments in the work of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA): the 32nd Session of
CMEA in mid-1978 and the CMEA Executive Committee meeting in early
1979; the relationship between CMEA and the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC); and the work of the two CMEA banks-the International Invest-
ment Bank (lIB) and the International Bank for Economic Cooperation
(IBEC). Each of these three areas will be discussed briefly below.
I. CMEA's 32nd Session and Executive
Committee Meeting
The 32nd Session of CMEA was held June 27-29, 1978, in Bucharest,
Romania. In addition to CMEA member states, Yugoslavia (based on a pre-
existing cooperation agreement between Yugoslavia and CMEA) and the
following observer countries also participated: North Korea, Angola, Laos
and Ethiopia. In addition, there were delegations present from Afghanistan
and South Yemen.
An important development occurring during the 32nd Session was
CMEA's unanimous approval for Vietnam to become a full CMEA member.
Vietnam was admitted even though there had been no announcement regard-
ing Vietnam's application or pending status following the May, 1978 CMEA
Executive Committee meeting in Moscow. Vietnam had had unofficial repre-
sentatives in different CMEA organizations since 1957, and since 1976 the
country had been an observer at CMEA sessions. In May 1977, the country
had been admitted to the two CMEA banks-iB and IBEC.'
*Mr. Shillinglaw practices law in Milwaukee.
'In November 1977, IBEC adopted a legal basis for altering the amount of its nominal capital
when a new country (such as Vietnam) becomes an IBEC member. The IBEC Council (the
Bank's highest management body) was granted the authority to increase IBEC's nominal capital
in an amount equal to the subscription payment (quota) designated for the country joining the
Bank.
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Vietnam's full CMEA membership is of particular interest because of the
policies that CMEA will probably have to adopt to accommodate a member
state which (like Cuba and Mongolia) is geographically remote from the
other CMEA states and whose economy is not as developed as are the econo-
mies of the European members of CMEA. Also, recent CMEA large-scale
projects have been designed for the contiguous Eastern European member
states and the U.S.S.R. (for example, the "Union" gas pipeline from Oren-
burg, U.S.S.R. to the western Soviet border and from there to Eastern
Europe; and the nearly completed electric transmission grid stretching from
Vinnitsa, U.S.S.R. to Albertisha, Hungary and on to the rest of Eastern
Europe).
In addition to projects where geography places Vietnam at a disadvantage,
in other CMEA projects (of types such as the Kiembaevski asbestos ore bene-
ficiation combine or the Ust-Ilimsk cellulose plant), it is doubtful that Viet-
nam would be able to make any significant contribution of technology or
machinery. Vietnam will probably become, at least in the foreseeable future,
the site of CMEA raw material development projects, as is presently the case
in Cuba (nickel) and Mongolia (copper). Specifically, CMEA could assist
Vietnam in oil extraction, with the contributing CMEA states being repaid in
oil.
The communique following CMEA's 32nd Session emphasized the need to
equalize the standards of economic development of all CMEA states, and in
particular to speed the development of Cuba and Mongolia.' Vietnam's de-
velopment will likewise undoubtedly become a CMEA priority. In fact, the
Session's communique also expressed an interest in widening "bilateral and
multilateral economic and scientific-cultural cooperation" with Laos,
Angola, and Ethiopia.'
The CMEA Charter provides that any change to the Charter must be
agreed to by all CMEA states." During the 32nd Session, the U.S.S.R. re-
portedly proposed that the Charter be amended so that certain decisions
currently requiring unanimity would in the future only require a majority
vote. This proposal, if in fact formally presented, was not adopted by the
Session. Another purported Soviet proposal (also not adopted) would have
made participation in CMEA's economic integration programs mandatory,
instead of voluntary as it is at present.
Although the above mandatory project participation plan was not adopted
at the 32nd Session, the Session did approve "long-term purposeful pro-
grams of cooperation" in energy, fuels and raw materials (especially atomic
2This emphasis was repeated in January 1979 by Leonid Brezhnev during a trip to Bulgaria.
TASS, Jan. 19, 1979. Also, it should be noted that the U.S.S.R. has an agency, the State
Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, which provides bilateral aid to developing coun-
tries at preferential rates.
'Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (U.S.S.R.), No. 28, July, 1978, at 12-13.
'CMEA CHARTER art. 17.
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energy plants),I agriculture,6 food industries, and machine building. The de-
cision regarding the development of long-term agreements in general had
been adopted earlier, during the 29th and 30th CMEA Sessions. The 31st
CMEA Session then agreed to develop specific preliminary cooperation
drafts for fuels, energy and raw materials. The secretary of CMEA had
stated, just prior to the 32nd Session, that these agreements would constitute
the main cooperative thrust for the CMEA members through 1990.' It is
noteworthy that oil and gas, which are of considerable importance to CMEA
countries, were not specifically mentioned as areas where energy cooperation
would be emphasized.8
These cooperation agreements, as adopted by the 32nd Session, are not
compulsory for CMEA member states. However, an announcement by the
heads of all delegations to the 32nd Session declared that the most important
task of CMEA member states in the near future would be to prepare drafts of
multilateral and bilateral agreements on concrete problems to be dealt with
by cooperation programs in the above subject areas.' The delegation heads
intended that these agreements would be signed before the 33rd CMEA Ses-
sion, to be held in Moscow in the summer of 1979 commemorating CMEA's
thirty years of existence.
Immediately following the 32nd Session in Bucharest, the 17th Session of
the CMEA Cooperative Planning Committee met and discussed methods to
implement the long-term agreements. This emphasis upon long-term agree-
ments was further underscored by the leader of the Soviet delegation and
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, A. N. Kosygin, who in his
speech to the 32nd Session pointed out that the Soviet government looks
upon these programs as "planning documents-not only declarations"
which "make concrete" the program of Socialist integration.'0 He also stated
that the contents of the programs will, to a significant extent, be included in
the 1981-85 national plans of CMEA member states. In fact, the benchmark
of the real importance of these programs will be the extent to which they are
included in these 1981-85 plans.
The CMEA Executive Committee met in Moscow on January 16-18, 1979.
The main areas of concern, as expected following the CMEA 32nd Session,
continued to be "organizational efforts" to carry out the "long-term pur-
'In early December 1978, the CMEA Committee for Planning Activity adopted a plan for
cooperative production of atomic power stations for 1981-90. Moscow DOMESTIC SERVICE, Dec.
7, 1978.
'The CMEA Agriculture Commission met in late-1978, at which time the plan for the
Commission's 1978-9 work was adopted. Selskaya Zhizn, Dec. I, 1978, at 3.
'Supra note 3, at 14.
'A potentially significant committee development which occurred during the 32nd Session was
the creation of Interneftprodukt. Its charter members are Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and the U.S.S.R. The stated purpose of the committee is to create an organization to
cooperate in several areas of petroleum products, in order "to satisfy the needs of these countries
in these products."
'Supra note 3, at 13.
'Id. at 14.
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poseful program of cooperation" (specifically an atomic power plant and
related electric transmission network). The Executive Committee also dis-
cussed assistance to Vietnam and the prolonged CMEA-EEC negotiations."I
CMEA member states' foreign trade has grown recently. The CMEA Per-
manent Commission on Foreign Trade, which oversees and coordinates this
trade, announced that there was a twenty-four percent increase in CMEA
members' foreign trade in 1977 compared to 1976. In 1977, this trade reached
158 billion roubles. Mutual trade turnover among CMEA countries in 1977
was twenty-eight percent higher than in 1975. reaching ninety-one billion
roubles. More recently, fifty-five-and-one-half percent of Soviet foreign
trade in the first half of 1978 was with fellow CMEA countries, compared to a
little over fifty-three percent in the first half of 1977. Despite this growth in
intra-CMEA trade, even CMEA country officials acknowledge that increas-
ing CMEA (especially Eastern Europe member states) cooperation in raw
materials with developing countries is necessitated by the projected decline in
the 1980s of Soviet raw material deliveries to Eastern Europe. Currently,
about two-thirds of Eastern Europe's raw material requirements are covered
by intra-CMEA bilateral agreements, and eighty percent of these deliveries
originate in the U.S.S.R. Since individual Eastern European CMEA member
state economies are not large enough to establish the required large-scale raw
materials long-term trade and production cooperation agreements with de-
veloping countries, these CMEA countries will have to become jointly in-
volved in such projects.' 2
Fixed pricing for intra-CMEA trade for five-year periods (in the middle
and end of each decade) had been based on average world "primary market"
prices for the immediately preceding five-year period. However, in early
1975, at Soviet suggestion, intra-CMEA prices were revised (one year early),
and some prices (including oil) were based on average prices for the preceding
three years. This was of benefit to the oil-exporting U.S.S.R., since the result-
ing oil prices reflected the 1973 world price increase. The resulting trade
imbalance in favor of the U.S.S.R. vis-d-vis Eastern Europe averaged ap-
proximately a billion roubles annually from 1975 through mid-1978. A recent
Hungarian commentary suggested that after 1980, it might be practical for
CMEA to return to the five-year period of price validity.'" Of course, with
increasing CMEA-country trade with the West, a pricing system for intra-
CMEA trade which more closely reflects western pricing helps to rationalize
the CMEA countries' total foreign trade.
CMEA pricing is currently, and will be at least through 1980, based on
annual price corrections. These prices are now in theory set on the basis of the
average world market price for the five years preceding the current year at
"TASS, Jan. 19, 1979.
'Raw Material Imports of Socialist Countries from the Developing Countries, FIGYELO, Dec.
27, 1978 (translation from Hungarian).
'A Further Development of the Socialist Foreign Trade Price System, KULGAZDASAG, Oct.
1978, at 38 (translation from Hungarian).
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issue. (It is thought that over five years, any short-term market fluctuations
will be greatly discounted.) In fact, price modifications are concluded bilater-
ally between member countries, but not necessarily annually and not neces-
sarily for every product traded between these two countries." More effective
multilateral CMEA price regulation is still required in order to minimize or
eliminate intra-CMEA price deviations which can (1) delay deliveries when
an exporter has found another higher CMEA country purchase price, or (2)
discourage acceptance of goods by an importer which has found a lower
selling price from another CMEA supplier.
Intra-CMEA oil prices for 1979 will be increased an estimated 17.6%,
thereby approaching the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries'
price level. Different Eastern European states will continue to pay the
U.S.S.R. different prices for this oil." If the present trend continues, the
Eastern Europe members of CMEA will require almost all of the U.S.S.R.'s
exported oil and gas by the mid- 1980s. Since the export of these commodities
currently constitutes approximately half of Soviet hard-currency earnings,
the Soviet government will be forced to make difficult choices allocating
these exports between the West and CMEA.'
I. CMEA-EEC Relationship
An area of continuing (though slow) development for CMEA is its attempt
to structure a relationship with the European Economic Community
(EEC). " There continues to be a fundamental difference in view between
CMEA and the EEC over the form of this relationship. CMEA wants a trade
clause included in its overall agreement with the EEC. Such a clause would
have the effect of elevating CMEA to the level of the EEC Commission, since
it would permit CMEA (through its Executive Committee) to negotiate trade
agreements with the EEC on behalf of its member states. The EEC position
(first officially adopted in 1974) continues to be that the CMEA Charter does
not empower that organization to conduct such negotiations. The EEC rea-
sons that CMEA is only an association of sovereign states, with no suprana-
tional institution analogous to the EEC Commission. 8 Furthermore, at a
more practical level, the EEC would have more leverage negotiating trade
agreements with individual CMEA states than it would negotiating with
CMEA itself.
141d.
'Frankfurter Allegemeine, Feb. 7, 1979, at II (translation from German).
'SHELL OIL COMPANY, TRADE IN EASTERN EUROPE I (Jan. 1979).
"For some of the recent developments in this area, see Shillinglaw, Cooperation Between
CMEA and EEC, 12 INT'L LAW. 677 (1978).
"As recently as March 1979, a Czechoslovak government communique repeated the CMEA
assertion that the CMEA Executive Committee does in fact have the competence to conclude
agreements with other international organizations (such as the EEC) to the same extent that
CMEA can negotiate agreements with individual countries. Rude Pravo, March 24, 1979, at 6
(translation).
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With the continuing unlikelihood that an EEC-CMEA trade agreement
will be the subject of negotiations, there were discussions in May 1978 con-
cerning CMEA-EEC agreements for informational exchanges in economic
forecasts, statistics, protection of the environment and standardization.
There was a follow-up CMEA-EEC meeting in Brussels in July 1978, al-
though no further developments occurred.
The communique to the 32nd CMEA Session in 1978 merely pointed out
that during the Session there had been an "exchange of opinions" among
CMEA members on the question of continuing contacts and discussions be-
tween the EEC and CMEA. The communique concluded that CMEA con-
tinues to take the position that discussions between the two organizations
should continue in order to reach agreement between "CMEA and CMEA
member states on the one hand and the EEC and EEC member states on the
other hand." 9 This position, if adhered to, would seemingly preclude indi-
vidual trade agreements between the EEC and CMEA member states. Imme-
diately following the 32nd Session, the CMEA Executive Committee met in
Bucharest and (among other items of business) adopted a decision regarding
EEC-CMEA cooperation which corresponded to that which had just been
adopted by the CMEA General Session. This, essentially, is where the current
relationship between the EEC and CMEA now stands.
If substantive trade issues are not soon dealt with by CMEA-EEC negotia-
tions, there may be an increase in EEC protectionist measures against Eastern
Europe products, such as those introduced against steel in early 1978. To
counter any such EEC measures, it is conceivable that other Eastern Euro-
pean states (in particular Poland and Hungary) would try to convince the
Soviet Union that it is in the best interest of these countries to follow
Romania's example of unilaterally approaching the EEC on this issue."0 Ro-
mania had earlier declared itself to be a developing country for purposes of
eligibility for EEC Generalized Preferences." The EEC responded by grant-
ing these preferences to Romania, which thereafter entered into technical
agreements with the EEC in the areas of textiles and steel."2 Poland's concern
was expressed in a communique in late 1978 which complained that EEC
volume restrictions and high EEC tariffs on imported manufactured goods
are the causes of the fact that nearly three-fifths of CMEA exports to the EEC
were raw materials and food. 3
"Supra note 3, at 12-13.
'"A Polish article, published in late 1978 and commenting on the slow progress of EEC-CMEA
cooperation, concluded with the observation that Polish trade with Western Europe is twice that
of any of the other CMEA countries (except the U.S.S.R.) and therefore Poland is "particularly
interested in successfully solving the issue of access to the Common Market." CMEA and the
Common Market-Artificial Division, POLITIKA, Nov. 25, 1978, at II (translation).
'OFFICAL JOURNAL E.E.C., L-358, 28 December 1973.22For textiles: Commission of E.E.C., COM (1977) 167 FINAL, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF E.E.C.,




Iii. CMEA Banks-i1B and IBEC
The International Investment Bank (1iB), which handles long-range
financing (up to fifteen years) for projects involving at least two CMEA
member countries, recently negotiated a $500 million loan from a consortium
of Western banks, with Dresdner Bank of Germany as the lead bank.2" The
interest rate margin over the London Interbank Rate was five-eighths of one
percent for the first two-and-one-half years of the ten-year loan, and three-
fourths of one percent for the remainder of the loan. The 1iB has stated that
the loan is for the Orenburg pipeline and for "other CMEA projects." 25
In early 1979, twelve Japanese banks loaned 1iB $175 million at 0.625%
over the London Interbank Rate. At least a part of these proceeds could be
used specifically for financing Eastern European (non-U.S.S.R.) CMEA oil
imports following the disruption of Iranian supplies. If so, this would be
IIB's first acknowledged loan for purposes other than investment. As a result
of this shift in loan policy, IIB will probably become increasingly involved in
financing CMEA-country projects in developing countries.2 6 This may be
done through a special IIB fund consisting of convertible currencies and
"transferable roubles. '"27
In early April 1978, the council of the other CMEA bank, the International
Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC), held its 47th Session. In addition to
IBEC members, the heads of the national banks of Finland, Yugoslavia, and
Laos also attended the session. During the session it was announced that the
Bank's operations in 1977 grew to over 140 billion transferable roubles.
In early 1977, the legal status of IBEC under British law had been ques-
tioned by British counsel to a western bank.' In response, in November 1977,
IBEC altered Article XI of the Agreement Concerning Multilateral Settle-
ments in Transferable Roubles and the Organization of IBEC of October 22,
1963. This amended Article XI now provides that IBEC is an international
organization possessing the right to sign international agreements with states
as well as with international organizations. Also, IBEC amended Article 5 of
its statutes to provide that in case of IBEC's default, its creditors would have
prior claim to the Bank's assets, and only after these claims are satisfied
would remaining assets be distributed among CMEA member states.
In April and May 1978, there was an exchange of public letters between the
Bank of England and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO).29 The Bank of England had asked the FCO for an opinion as to the
legal capacity under British law of an international financial institution, such
"EAST-WEST Markets, May 30, 1977, at 8.
2
'Business Eastern Europe, May 20, 1977, at 157.
2
"Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (U.S.S.R.), Oct. 30, 1978, at 20.
2 Raw Material Imports of Socialist Countries from the Developing Countries, supra note 7.
For a short discussion of "transferable roubles" see Shillinglaw, The Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA), 11 INT'L LAW. 580 (1977).
2 See Shillinglaw, supra note 27.
"'Copies of letters on file with author.
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as IBEC or 1iB, to sue and be sued in English courts on loan agreements
governed by English law. This question concerned an international institu-
tion which (1) had been established by sovereign states pursuant to a treaty (as
opposed to being a creation of local law of these states) to engage in financial
activities, and (2) which had been granted legal personality by these states
under the law of the member state in which the institution has its permanent
location. The Bank of England also asked the FCO if in the future the FCO
would supply a statement to an English court regarding the FCO's opinion as
to such an institution's legal personality under British law.
The FCO, in reply, stated that in its opinion such a financial institution
does have legal personality in the United Kingdom.3" The FCO added that if
an English court were to ask it for an official statement on behalf of the
United Kingdom Executive regarding such an institution's legal personality,
it would be willing to supply such a statement in an actual case. Although
such a statement by the British Executive would not be binding on British
courts, it would undoubtedly be very persuasive.
On a separate matter, IBEC in November 1977 also altered its statutes to
permit itself to extend loans to CMEA institutions as well as to CMEA mem-
ber states. For example, IBEC can now loan funds directly to Interato-
menergo, the CMEA atomic energy organization, which could well become
the recipient of a number of IBEC loans because of the 32nd Session's em-
phasis upon atomic energy.
A final point regarding the work of the CMEA banks is whether any loan
or other commercial transaction by an American bank with IBEC or 1iB
would violate United States federal law under section 5(b) of the Trading with
the Enemy Act,' absent specific license by the Secretary of the Treasury. The
specific question is whether such a loan would be construed as a loan made
indirectly to CMEA member Vietnam in violation of the Foreign Assets Con-
trol Regulations," or to CMEA member Cuba in violation of the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations."
Both of these regulations are administered by the Foreign Assets Control
Office in the Department of Treasury. Neither of the regulations covers any
multilateral organization in which the combined interests of two or more
designated countries control less than twenty-five percent of the obligations
of the organization." Since Vietnam is the only CMEA country to which the
Foreign Assets Control Regulations apply, and, of course, Cuba is the only
country to which the Cuban Assets Control Regulations apply, it is quite
doubtful that either of the regulations would apply to CMEA (or to IBEC or
1iB) based on either of the above twenty-five percent provisions.
3Od.
'50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976).
' 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1978).
133 C.F.R. § 515 (1978).
3431 C.F.R. §§ 500.303(c), 515.303(c) (1978).
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Another consideration affecting loans from United States banks to IBB or
IBEC (in other words, loans in fact made indirectly to 1iB and IBEC member
states) is the conceivable (though improbable) application of the United
States Johnson Act.3" This Act proscribes certain financial operations by any
person within the United States with any foreign government in default in
payment of its obligations to the United States. Certain 1iB and IBEC mem-
ber states are in this default position,36 The Act currently applies to the
U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Poland. Furthermore, certain "delinquent
obligations" of Cuba could in theory constitute "defaults" for purposes of
the Act. Bulgaria and Hungary are not in default for purposes of the Act;
Mongolia has not been party to a transaction which would subject it to John-
son Act liability; Romania and Vietnam, as members of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are expressly exempted from Johnson
Act coverage.
Four United States Attorney General opinions37 have interpreted the Act in
such a way as to exclude certain transactions from its coverage. For example,
both loans by branches of United States banks incorporated abroad and
"normal export financing" arrangements are excluded. The United States
Justice Department has never initiated any action under the Act because of
financial transactions with any CMEA member country. This inactivity has
resulted in the Act not being an impediment to United States-CMEA country
financing.
"l18 U.S.C. § 955 (1978).
"CMEA countries' debt to the West is currently placed at more than $50 billion and is ex-
pected to grow to $80 billion by 1980. Even this latter level is considered manageable given the
extensive energy and other raw materials in the U.S.S.R. and, to a lesser extent, in the Eastern
European member states of CMEA. TRADE IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 16, at 4.
37 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 505 (1934); 39 Op. ATT'Y GEN 398 (1939); 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 229 (1963);
42 Op. ATT'y GEN. 357 (1967).

